Philosophy?

Philosophy is often viewed, at the very least, as a school of disciplined and systematic thought; where theories and discussions rest upon the basis of a logical, rational, consistent and structured system. For some, this much is certain and deemed to be sufficient, such that Philosophy exists in the minds of these individuals, as but one mode of thought, not necessarily definitive of that individual's belief; possibly amongst other systems of thought that may or may not dictate a similarly stringent structure- let this position be known as the liberal interpretation. Philosophy so interpreted represents a game of complex rules concerning consistency and rationality, not necessarily with any aim other than the satisfaction gained by individual s who chose to challenge their mind with the task of organising concepts within the confines of predefined rules. This satisfaction might emane from the existence and the perceived conquest of the challenge itself, or the recognition of others when they le a rn of such conquest; a satisfaction similar to that involved in a game such as chess, where participants are challenged to achieve a certain result, from an accepted beginning, within the confines of predefined moves. This liberal interpretation would all ow for and respect the obvious existence of a multitude of other systems, many of which can perhaps be said to be far more indicative of belief. The value an individual desires to have assigned, and the bearing upon that individual's belief is therefore a matter of subjective taste, that the relevant individual may or may not perceive as optional.

Drifting from the liberal position, most would venture further to claim that Philosophy involves a search for the truth in at least some form; since it must be ad mitted that there exists at the very least a search for the philosophical truth so to speak, if nothing else. Such that Philosophy must be more than a mere game, since there must be some value to the finding of philosophical truth (assuming that it is tho u ght to be a meaningful truth), that is more than the satisfaction to be found in mere games. However, there exists the issue of how it is that one is to value this said truth, in relation to other possible truths or similar entities; that is, if it is adm i tted at all that there can be such alternative that is recognisable as a truth. Under the liberal interpretation, there would be no need to perform any such valuation, but an interpretation that values philosophical truth at all must necessarily involve a balance in relation to alternatives, that is unless those alternatives are banished ab initio, for otherwise it would be impossible to gauge relative validity without such mechanism of balance. This writer would hereby submit that there does exist a possi ble explanation (or rather, a mechanism in support thereof, which would allow) for this apparent difficulty; that is able to evaluate, by the assignment of meaningful value to, Philosophy in relation to and as well as all other structures, beliefs or concepts. Thus it would be possible to put into perspective the validity of, meaning of and reason for not only Philosophy, but all other belief structures. It is lamentable that this is a task too arduous and lengthy for containment within the current discourse, and this writer would reserve the endeavour to be divulged in a separate undertaking.

However, in any event, even such limited liberation is rare, especially amongst the purported practitioners of this discipline. Thus there exists the third and final d istinction along this continuous spectrum; for there are others still who insist that any such valuation is unnecessary, since Philosophy or rationality has no alternative; that is, any result founded thereupon must be believed since it is the only truth a nd that it would be wrong to deny the truth, or to condone to anything that is irrational, inconsistent or otherwise inconsistent. It is then difficult to explain the conflict necessarily emaning from this position; that on the one hand incompatible syste m s of thought are invalid and must not dictate belief, while it is undeniable that these condemned structures do exist in reality and have command over large proportions of societies. The easiest and most common explanation offered (though it might more ap p ropriately be termed a condemnation) is that these individuals that subscribe to incompatible structures are simply misguided by their own ill education, blinded from the manifestly illogical or inconsistent nature, leading to indoctrination by those seek ing so to do. This writer would hypothesise that there must be, or at least there should be constructed, a more profound and less demeaning explanation for this paradox; such a mechanism, as aforementioned, is speculated to be possible.

Philosophical discourses invariably involve the formulation of a passage, from a given set of assumptions to results that may or may not be known or expected. These assumptions are either accepted by the writer to be true or natural, or have theretofore been proved to his s atisfaction so to be via a similar process. By the term assumption of nature or truth, more often than not one refers to those truths or facts that have pervaded sufficiently into present society (pervasion either in terms of time or extent) such that they are no longer or seldom questioned. The very structure of philosophy, or system of logic are examples of such instances; these concepts have become so well accepted and for so long a duration of time, such that rarely does one question or feel the need to prove why it is that one should be consistent, rational or logical- it is simply obvious. However, the question of why these assumptions are accepted and why they are able to maintain high stability is another investigation altogether.

The result of philosophical discourse may present themselves in two distinct forms; firstly, as an explanation of or outlook upon, a concept or state of affairs, and secondly, as a principle for guidance or a statement of fact. Whatever the results or assumptions (however subjective or objective they are initially deemed to be), it is the process formulated that must comply with the pre-defined rules of consistency and logic. Though objectively invalid or unconvincing assumptions might not t end to persuade, or even meet with some amount of negativity, falling foul of rules concerning consistency or logic will most certainly induce much criticism against the writer concerned. For there are those who constantly occupy themselves with the searc h for, and take tremendous pleasure and celebration in finding, these supposed breaches within the words of other writers; writers who may or may not have aspired to the same purported perfection that is prescribed by the commentator's own discipline. But it is not the quest of the initial writer that concerns these self-proclaimed guardians of the sideline and boundaries of what is to be allowed, but the mode of expression utilised.

However, it is interesting to note that, though aware of the final result and possibly even the basic assumptions that this arose from, many common subscribers of Philosophy will not have explicit knowledge of the intricate arguments that is the essence of the philosophical process. What then is the meaning of philosophical truth to these individuals? Can it meaningfully be said that their belief is either supported, confirmed or proved by Philosophy , even in the absence of actual knowledge of how this is to be done? Or is the belief simply compatible as a matter of incidence or delegation? That is, that the individual trust's and is satisfied that someone else has explicit knowledge. It is important to ask whether it truly is the perfect consistency or flawless logic that has convinced the individual, or rather some form of endorsement by selective individuals. What is the nature of this belief structure, if it does at all exist in the mind of any individuals? Is such a style of belief compatible with the philosophical process of finding the truth? Is such a belief by that individual meaningful in the eyes of Philosophy? For such forms of belief founded upon delegation and trust appears more akin to what may also be termed as simple indoctrination; though one might draw the distinction that this particular belief results from a legitimate or a cceptable form of indoctrination, as opposed to those which have been labelled illegitimate.